sium. And, as a hint of things to come, it is at least as tricky today as it was when Wolfgang Friedmann published The Changing Structure of International Law to find authentic spokesmen for these alleged Euro-American 'vues' which have to be confronted.
In his published introduction to the symposium, 4 Charles Leben brings out the exquisite irony in the choice of Friedmann, of all persons, as an icon for a symposium designed to confront European and American views. It was from a feeling that this international legal culture had become less 'plural', less diversified, less truly 'international' man in Friedmann's time that the idea arose to invite a group of 'trans-Atlantic' authors to participate in a Symposium on the current state of international law, with the aim of strengthening the still too loose links between people and schools of thought on both sides of the ocean.
Hence the idea of setting out from a reconsideration of the themes of Friedmann's undoubtedly best-known work. The Changing Structure of International Law. We felt this book typified one current of thought in international law (which might be called a current of institutionalist thought) that marked the 1960s.
We doubt, whether today (or ever) 'European' and 'American' or, indeed, any binary polarity have sufficiently sharp edges and cultural and professional bite to explain those changes which have occurred in our field over the last thirty-five years or to offer insight regarding the current-day divergences in and of the field as regards change and stability in international law.
But 'Euro-American' can be viewed as a surrogate for something else -a surrogate for the importance of perspective itself and a far greater willingness to give weight (for good and/or for bad) to divergent perspectives -epistemological and ontological, cultural and biographical, ideological and functional -as determining international legal descriptive and normative perceptions.
If this is so, among the most interesting developments over the last generation has not, perhaps, been the changing structure of international law itself in the sense of the emergence of new institutions, norms, organizational frameworks and the theoretical debates about the extent and significance of such developments, but in the emergence of a debate about the debate. A debate about the very discourse of international law. Friedmann may, as we stated, not have been so surprised to observe the extent to which '... a more clearly established hierarchy of norms' has emerged in the international legal system since the publication of his book in the nascent and not so nascent doctrines of, say, jus cogens, obligations ergo omnes, and all the rest He could rightly claim that he had, in some sense, predicted these changes. But, in our view, he would have been both surprised and maybe even shocked by an even bigger change whereby the ontological (what it is) and epistemological (how we know about it) bases of international legal scholarship have fractured into much more than American and European 'vues' in the last three decades.
But even if this is so, could it not be argued that there is, after all, a sharp European-American cleavage in relation to the willingness or otherwise to accord cardinal weight to perspective? To the importance or otherwise which is attached to 'discourse about discourse', the very terminological ugliness of which -and the rejection thereof -become a 'sign' for a newly emerging dichotomy between a 'classical' European 'vue' and a modernist or post-modernist 'American' one? There may be some truth to this, and often it is an ugly truth. When they do not simply pass each other like trains in the night, there is between these different 'vues' incomprehension and even plain and simple ignorance. At times there is worse. In the writing of some of the modernists and post-modernists there is not infrequently an ill-concealed dismissal, even contempt, of more classical doctrinal discourse. Sometimes, in corridor talk, it is dubbed 'old fashioned' and 'European'. Equally, the very notion of, say, feminist international law is met with hoots of derision and dubbed, in one of the more milder expressions, as an 'American hang up'. The ease with which intellectual and even political disagreement revert to national and nationallike characterization has its own less than exquisite irony. Be that as it may, as will emerge, 3 we doubt whether there is really a dichotomy rather than a graduation of views and we certainly reject the Atlantic as defining the fault line. In some respects, there are more profound differences on all these issues as one travels -in different periods -the short distance up the Hudson River Valley from Manhattan to New Haven and then further north to the Boston Bay than there 5 In some measure, the footnotes will tell the tale concerning the coincidence of Continental origin with a legal 'world-view'.
Appropriately
are across the Ocean. And some of the world-views which inform the debate have travelled faster from Paris to Princeton than they have from, say, the Collige de France to the IHEL We divide our essay into three parts. In the first and most important -even if hardly original -part we pick up the Question Is there a hierarchy of norms in international law? and analyse its ontological and epistemological premises. Through this analysis we present five l vues': the New Haven vue, the 'Critical' vue, the Feminist vue, the vue of international relations and, with a certain measure of Chutzpah, a Pantheon vue. Nobody likes to be labelled And, naturally, these categories are approximate -some more than othersand contain within each much diversity. Yet, even if the label 'Christian' contains Catholics, Lutherans, otherProtestants, not to mention Greek Orthodox, it is useful when juxtaposed with, say, Muslims. Thus, there are major differences between, say, a Carry and a Koskenniemi, but we still found it useful to group them together under the Critical School. The Pantheon vue represents the richly classical position of, say, a Prosper Weil in his famous Double Normativity article. 6 We readily acknowledge that it, too, is a very loose umbrella.
In the second part of this essay we illustrate briefly how these different schools view the question of Hierarchy. In the third part we offer some final reflections on how, in the light of the new world order, the politics of the debate about hierarchy may be changing.
L Is There a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law? -The Question
If the task is to trace evolution over the last thirty years, no answer we can give to the theme of 'hierarchy* would be as interesting, provocative and illuminating as the Question itself. In this case, there is nothing subtle in its formulation, but, rather, a no less exquisitely defiant, surely tongue-in-cheek, challenge; an unrepentant 'prise de position', most clearly designed to provoke not in what it asks but in how it asks.
A. Is There a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law?
First there is the is as in Is there a hierarchy of norms in international law! Three elements stand out in this formulation: one element suggests an appropriate province of inquiry. The others relate to epistemology and ontology. a. This formulation of the Question conveys a confident Hume-like positivism which clearly privileges 'is' over 'ought' as the appropriate object of 'scientific inquiry'. Note that, we are not asked whether '... there should be a hierarchy of norms?' In the vocabulary of our field, the Question makes it its business to remind us of the priority of existing lex lata over the wishful thinking of de lege fercnda and, supposedly, of the primary task of an international lawyer to answer the question 'What is the Law?', rather than, say, 'What should the law be?'. The first question is law, the other one, interesting and important as it may be, is not The alleged 'neutrality' of law was (and remains) a destructive myth; and the concern of some major frames of jurisprudence exclusively for identifying the causes and consequences of rules or decisions was not enough. The contemporary exigencies of humankind required the conscious, deliberate use of law as an instrument of policy.
9
Instrumentality for what? What is the underlying non-neutral value of law-asinstrumentality? Famously,
The fundamental goal which we postulate for the world constitutive process of authoritative decision, as for all public order, is that of human dignity: me inherent and equal value of every human being. The core test of constitutive and public order decision at any level of interaction is its immediate and prospective contribution to the realization of human dignity in a world commonwealth, sufficiently strong to protect the common interest and sufficiently flexible to permit the widest range of diversity to flourish. rather than found in actual practice. The variety of references among these discursive areas [sources, process, and substance] always shrewdly locates the moment of authority and the application in practice elsewhere.' 14 An external critique discovers the ideological character of the application of these, allegedly neutral, legal norms as grounded in the cultural and political background of the lawyer, shaped in a 'peculiarly Western concept of law' which disregards the 'partial, multilayered and fragmented nature of international society'.
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As these two citations suggest, while this approach calls into question cpistemological certainty, it cannot escape a normative (ought) Archimedian point And there is an evident tension between the claim of the emptiness of legal norms and the claim of their ideological bias.
Another challenge to classical epistemology, which is related to, but nevertheless distinct from, 'critical' work, comes from radical feminism, which wants to expose 'the gender bias of apparently neutral systems of rules'." The understanding of norms and their effect on the situation of women is not possible by a neutral, distant, 'scientific' assessment, but depends on a 'lived knowing': 'Feminist method as practiced in consciousness raising, taken as a theory of knowing about social being, pursues another epistemology. Women are presumed able to have access to society and its structure because they live in it and have been formed by it, not in spite of those facts.' 17 'Consciousness raising', 'practical reasoning' and 'experiential analysis' are distinct feminist methods of analysis, which shall help women to express their concrete experience of suppression and male dominance. 18 The basic concepts of international law, such as state sovereignty, l9 jus co- gens, 10 self-determination, 21 human and women's rights, 22 are unveiled as an expression of a gendered, distinctively male world view. This is particularly visible in the distinction between a public sphere, which is dominated by men and subject to international legal norms, and a private sphere, to which women are mostly confined and which is free from international interference for the protection of women's rights. ' [T]he definition of certain principles of international law rests on and reproduces the public/private distinction. It thus privileges the male world view and supports male dominance in the international legal order.' 23 Like the 'Crits', therefore, feminists emphasize the contextuality of norm interpretation, which depends on 'the political, economic, historical and cultural context in which people live'. 24 Whereas die 'crits', however, argue that legal norms as such lack any content distinct from die cultural predisposition of the lawyer, radical feminists understand them as powerful tools for the preservation of male dominance. 23 As to ontological certainty, students of modern communication dwory 2 * emphasize the graduation both of the determinacy of norms and of their influence on behaviour. On the one hand, the meaning of norms is not completely determined at the time of their creation. It is in the nature of language that it clarifies in part and in part obscures. Some words clarify, others obscure. 'No Vehicles in tibe Park' clarifies the situation vis-h-vis automobiles but is obscuring as regards skateboards. Clarification often takes place by the actors in a continuous process of communication in the process of its application. The formation of law can therefore not be clearly distinguished from its application, and its determinacy is subject to a con- Equally evocative is die insistence of die Question on norms -a rule-based conception of international law. In this view, the core of international law is a set of norms or rules commanding die behaviour of actors. When we talk about hierarchy of norms in this sense, the focus is shifted to the normative content of rules, since in this way we would learn operationally which rules 'trump' others and which values are more or less important on the normative hierarchical scale.
But to leave the question at this level masks so much -operationally and normatively. Should we not also be thinking of international law as process rather than, or as well as, norms? Operationally, does die image of the lawyer determining the content of norms and actors behaving or misbehaving accordingly really capture in- policies, the analysis of factors affecting decision, the description of past and the projection of future trends in decision, and the invention and evaluation of policy alternatives.
31
'Critical' scholars go one step further. Liberated from the necessity of conforming themselves to ready-made rules, lawyers are not confined to the preferences and values of their society, but can put forward their own agendas as 'conscious social agents'. 32 Renouncing the normative requirement of generalizability and abstraction, lawyers can at last openly take the cultural, historical and political context into consideration rather than do it subconsciously or in the closet The task of the professional lawyer consists in the proposal of solutions to particular cases:
[The character of normative problem-solution ... [is] a practice of attempting to reach the most acceptable solution in the particular circumstances of the case. It is not the application of ready-made, general rules or principles but a conversation about what to do, here and now.
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In the face of these approaches, the Pantb6on's defiant insistence on norms in the Question may appear to some as staid, but to others it may seem appealingly refreshing and maybe even a newly found Galilean modernism: And yet.. . it movesl he said. And yet... Law is Normsl C Is There a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law! Finally, the usage of 'international law' is equally evocative in its defiance, for it insists on disciplinary independence and purity. It is a rejection of the view which situates international law firmly in, or as part of, say, international relations and in the academic investigation of international law as part of political science. The critique of the background position of our Question has so far remained within the realm of what traditionally counts as the function of law: to provide guidance in the solution of problems or the taking of decisions. Only the criteria were in question. Looking for hierarchies of actors or institutions instead of rules, we leave, however, as it seems, the traditional realm of law and reach out to other pastures: political and social sciences. We have taken the New Haven approach and several strands of the Critical approaches as icons with which to confront that of the Pantheon. In relation to the previous two issues, the Panth6on was in splendid isolation. On this issue, it engages in an 'Entente cordiale' with the Crits, for the defence of the purity of legal discourse. 14 For proponents of the multidisciplinary approach, which challenges any sharp line between international law and social sciences, international lawyers admit that law is only 'one small part of international communications'. 15 But if legal rules play a minor role in 'international society', why do we not discuss more 'relevant* questions? If law is only a result of the international power structure, should we not rather ask for 'hierarchies of states' or, more generally, for all hierarchies in the international system? 36 Some theories of international relations have been developed in explicit opposition to international law. Remember the resounding fanfare of Hans Morgenthau's refutation of international law: 'Grandiose legalistic schemes purporting to solve the ills of the world have replaced the less spectacular, painstaking search for the actual laws and the facts underlying them.' 37 Are we not in a similar situation today, wanting to describe 'hierarchies of norms' in a world which Samuel Huntington has described as standing before a 'clash of civilizations'.
What role, then, for international law as such, not mentioning its eventual hierarchies?
Relief comes from a somewhat unexpected quarter. Having tried to establish a theory of the international system with little, if any, regard to international law, some of the 'realists' came to the conclusion that the analysis of power capabilities alone was not sufficient to explain areas of cooperation between states. Conspicuously avoiding anything too close to international law, they have described these areas as 'regimes'. One of the most prominent scholars defines regimes 'as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations'.
39
That sounds amazingly similar to the description of law by a legal realist Note, 34 Cf however, that principles, norms and procedures in Krasner's sense are independent of any formal source.
40
The most important distinction between the perspectives of the two disciplines, however, seems to regard the limitation of regimes to 'a given area of international relations'. Whereas me international lawyer tends to think of a unified system of international law -which includes, of course, the possibility of more specific, regional or bilateral law -regime theorists regard regimes as a sort of rule-governed isle in the sea of international power struggles. But we can also discern problems of this, apparently easy and indisputable, positivist confirmation of international law hierarchies. There is, firstly, the indeterminate contents of jus cogens -which gives rise to the suspicion that either jus cogens norms are so indisputable that codification adds nothing to their quality, or so disputed that they never meet the criteria for their creation, namely the acceptance and recognition as peremptory norms 'by the international community of States as a whole'. 30 And, secondly, the treaty mode of the creation of such norms leaves the question open of whether they are binding on those who resist them and have not become parties to the relevant Convention -France and the United States, for instance, in relation to the Vienna Convention, Switzerland for the UN Charter.
31 And when we look to customary law or general principles, we will find the same consensualist puzzle in the question of the applicability of the persistent objector-rule to jus cogens. 51 The assertion of hierarchies in international law challenges the very foundations of a classical, positivist account of international law -sovereign equality and consent -and revives thereby the ancient debate between naturalists and positivists. cepts such as a hierarchy of norms arc political tools for the promotion of a substantial end." These different 'takes' on Hierarchy should not come as a surprise. As the question touches the most basic principles and rules of international law, it can only be expected that it will be profoundly shaped by differing ontological and epistemological premises.
HI. Is There a Hierarchy of Norms hi International Law -A Changing Politics
We have, of course, no intention of giving a doctrinal answer -important as it isor indeed any answer, to the Question. But we wish to conclude with a brief and tentative consideration and speculation on the evolving debate.
One core aspect of the Hierarchy Debate has related to 'super-norms' -jus cogens, obligations erga omnes and crimes of state. The drive behind them and the opposition to them employed different rhetorics.
One rhetoric was pragmatic and concerned the principled need, or otherwise, of an ever more complex legal system to have -as a functional necessity -graduated norms and a hierarchy to resolve conflicts among them. That was the animus behind Friedmann's own prescription.
There was a second debate about the content of such norms. Often times opposition to the content spilled over to the principle of graduation and hierarchy: by raising norms the contents of which suited one's interests in norms of a higher value and by side-stepping thereby the traditional consensual norm-creation machinery, one could hope to transform international law without assuring universal consent for the change of every single norm. 67 Finally, the hierarchy debate became part of a broader discussion which concerned the very telos of the international system. Should it be conceived -in a liberal tradition of the polity -as a system of coordination among sovereign states pursuing their national interest in a broad zone of liberty protected by international law 61 or, should it be conceived -in a more communitarian tradition -as a community of states with certain collective goals and values transcending the individual or even aggregate national interest of its (principal) members? 69 Since the notions of obligations erga omnes, jus cogens and crimes of state -employing a rhetoric such as 'international community as a whole' -were associated with the second, communitarian, conception, they were supported or opposed accordingly.
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The lines drawn typically pitted the 'Old West' -principally the United States which was mostly sceptical or even hostile to graduation -against 'progressive' forces, typically the Second and Third Worlds which supported graduation. 71 The reasons used in opposition concerned all three issues. On the systemic level, graduation of norms, it was feared, would dilute certainty and, most importantly, since the system did not have adequate mechanisms to match the consequences with the breach (to make a Crime really count as a Crime) it was thought that graduation would actually cheapen the values it sought to privilege or would lead to instability. As regards content and the conception of the system, the opposition was principally political, however masked in legal rhetoric. Since the Second and Third World states and some others who supported them vastly outnumbered the 'Old West', and since they were perceived to be hostile to America, the United States always feared that it would end up being dubbed the Criminal. Graduation and hierarchy of norms were a sharp, if banal, example of Cold War wrangling in the arena of international legal process.
Today, in the post Cold War era, we may expect to find the tables turned. We may expect the old Third World' to be much less enamoured with graduation/hierarchy and much more attached to coexisting, 'multicultural' legal universes. We would not be surprised if the United States -enjoying an unprecedented political hegemony -would discover the virtues of graduation and hierarchy, given her ability both to influence as never before the content of norms and especially to control the consequences of breach.
72 It may be a telling sign that the United States, formerly an opponent to any 'criminalization' of international law, has changed heart and is now advocating individual 'criminal' responsibility before international bodies. To be sure, both 'visions' -at least in their vulgar perception by the public -are oversimplified and overreaching. Both seem to undervalue the structural constraints of a world which is still largely dominated by more or less sovereign states. 79 But we believe both Fukuyama and Huntington describe pretty well the poles of current problems and debates on the role of hierarchies in international law.
The more diverse civilizations, traditions, attitudes there are in the world, the stronger the claim for 'second degree' law, which does not purport to resolve deep value conflicts but to make coexistence of radically opposed value systems possible. And, yet, the more the future world comes to rely or depend for its material and spiritual future well-being on common values such as sustained development, human rights, free human and material exchange, the more the 'world community' will require a unitary, hierarchized international law.
It seems as if the issue is to remain in flux. Always there, always changing.
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This was one centnl argument of Huntington's initial critique of Fukuyama, tee 'No Exit', supra note 78, at 4 «t seq.
